This commentary provides valuable insight into the basic tenets of an unknown sect from the formative years of Hellenistic Pythagoreanism, a movement which had a major impact on the morality and philosophy of the Greco-Roman world.

I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical (...) fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states. (shrink)

The orthodox definition of hope suffers from an exclusion problem: it is unable to exclude subjects without hope. In fact, the orthodox definition even allows for despair to be falsely classified as hope. This problem suggests two basic desiderata for a successful analysis of hope: it should solve the exclusion problem, and it should have the resources to explain why, in a given situation, a subject does or does not form a hope. Bearing these desiderata in mind, I assess two (...) recent hope‐accounts offered by Jack M. C. Kwong and Cheshire Calhoun. I then offer my own view, which is based on the Jamesian notion of a “live possibility”. I suggest that a possibility needs to reach a certain probability threshold in order to count as live, and according to my account, to hope is to desire the truth of such a live possibility. This view is well‐equipped to solve the exclusion problem, and it can explain why a subject does or does not hope. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 685-698, December 2021.

According to an increasingly popular view known as non-doxasticism, religious faith need not include belief, but only some cognitively weaker attitude. This view comes with great promises, as it offers a way for the agnostic to partake in religion. My concern is how such a non-doxastic faith might be understood as a rational attitude. I offer three desiderata for any account of rational, non-doxastic faith. These desiderata are based on general considerations regarding epistemic rationality and on major themes from current (...) literature on the closely related notions of trust and hope. The first desideratum states that faith must be able to meet the demands of reason. The second requires, perhaps surprisingly, that faith should not imply trust. The third requires that faith should imply hope while excluding despair. I show how several prominent accounts of non-doxastic faith, by Lara Buchak, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Daniel McKaughan, all fail to meet at least one of these desiderata. I also suggest that the desiderata should make us prefer a reconstructive methodology. (shrink)

It is standardly assumed that a religious commitment needs to be based upon religious belief, if it is to be rationally acceptable. In this thesis, that assumption is rejected. I argue for the feasibility of belief-less religion, with a focus on the approach commonly known as “non-doxasticism”. According to non-doxasticism, a religious life might be properly based on some cognitive attitude weaker than belief, like hope, acceptance or belief-less assumption. It provides a way of being religious open exclusively to the (...) agnostic. This thesis consists of an introductory essay and five independent papers. The aim of the introductory essay is to provide a general background and set the stage for the discussion in the papers. Its first major part is about the rationality of religious belief. I assess three major ways of providing rational justification for religious belief: natural theology, the reformed epistemology of A. Plantinga and W. Alston, and voluntarism as advocated by B. Pascal and W. James. I highlight some of the most serious problems associated with these approaches, and argue that these problems are enough to warrant an exploration of belief-less alternatives. The second major part of the introductory essayintroduces belief-less religion and its two main forms: fictionalism and non-doxasticism. Both approaches are presented in some detail, including important accounts and current developments. While I would not deny thatboth approaches can be defended as intellectually feasible and rationally acceptable ways of being religious, I also explain why I think non-doxasticism is to be preferred over fictionalism. Paper I and II concerns the account of non-doxastic religion offered by J. L. Schellenberg. Paper I raises some problems for Schellenberg’s analysis of propositional faith, and presents a way of handling these problems by making faith occasional. Paper II argues that non-doxasticism should be focused on traditional religion rathar than Schellenberg’s simple ultimism. Paper III and IV concerns non-doxasticism on a more general level. Paper III argues for the superiority of non-doxasticism over fictionalism. It contains the argument for exclusive availability, according to which only non-doxasticism is rationally available to the pro-religious agnostic. Paper IV explores the notion of rational, non-doxastic faith, and argues for three desiderata any such faith must meet. Unlike the other papers, Paper V is primarily connected to the first part of the introductory essay, and it concerns the scope and limit of natural theology. It is tentatively argued that perfect being theism lies outside the scope of natural theology, and that its most prominent arguments at best support some kind of deism. (shrink)

On the standard view, an agnostic might commit non-doxastically to religion because she wants to receive some goods, which might be either natural or supernatural in kind. I broaden the picture by showing how the agnostic must also take negative factors into account. Negative mundane factors should be avoided as far as possible by the agnostic, and in extreme cases, even at the price of giving up supernatural goods. Negative supernatural factors, like eternal torment, work differently. An agnostic who considers (...) an eternity of suffering in hell a live possibility might rationally make a religious commitment in order to avoid it. Non-doxastic religion is commonly conceived as requiring a pro-attitude. If fear can have the impact I suggest, we must broaden the picture to allow for a negatively based commitment as well. To make explicit the kind of attitude relevant here, I offer an analysis of fear as a rational, non-doxastic attitude. (shrink)

. In the philosophy of J. L. Schellenberg, “evolutionary religion” is a religious stance oriented towards the deep future. According to Schellenberg, the best form of evolutionary religion is non-doxastic faith in ultimism. I reject Schellenberg’s arguments for preferring ultimism and suggest that committing non-doxastically to traditional religion makes more sense from an evolutionary perspective. I argue that the alignment argument for traditional religion remains sound even when the deep future is considered. Furthermore, I assess Schellenberg’s claim that humanity is (...) religiously immature. (shrink)

Abraham J. Malherbe was one of the most influential New Testament scholars of the past half century. He is especially known for his use of Hellenistic moral philosophy in the interpretation of New Testament texts, especially Pauline literature. Whilst the comparative study of New Testament and Greco-Roman material remains a contentious approach in scholarship, Malherbe’s work provides important pointers in how to make such comparisons in a meaningful and reasoned manner, by paying due respect to the integrity of the texts (...) being compared and to the function textual elements have within their own contexts. I discussed the salient features of Malherbe’s approach, focusing in particular on his study of topoi. One of the most significant findings was Malherbe’s emphasis on the dialectical combination of common and individual elements in such topoi, which enabled ancient authors to embed their own texts within the cultural discourse of their time. His approach opens the way to further research of the New Testament within its philosophical context without requiring proof of a genealogical relationship between the texts or authors concerned. (shrink)

A guide to aligning your life with the frequencies of the Nine Waves of Creation.

Simon Peter undergoes a considerable development from his first introduction in the Gospel of Mark to later narratives, where he gains remarkable miraculous abilities. In Mark, he witnesses Jesus performing numerous miracles without himself being named as the performer of a single one, but in Matthew’s Gospel Peter walks on water (Matt 14:22–33), in Acts he heals two paralytics and raises a woman from the dead (Acts 3:1–10; 9:32–42), and in the fourth-century Latin Acts of Peter, also known as Actus (...) Vercellenses, he makes a dog speak (Acts Pet. 9.9–15), miraculously restores a shattered marble statue (11.8–23) and revives several people from the dead (27.1–11; 28.63–66). This article examines how Peter’s various miracles contribute to their respective stories, analyses how they reflect the needs of their respective authors, and discusses what they tell us about the use of genre in the narrative tradition about the apostle Peter and his miracles. (shrink)

It is usually the case that scientists examine either ecological systems or social systems, yet the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the problems of environmental management and sustainable development is becoming increasingly obvious. Developed under the auspices of the Beijer Institute in Stockholm, this new book analyses social and ecological linkages in selected ecosystems using an international and interdisciplinary case study approach. The chapters provide detailed information on a variety of management practices for dealing with environmental change. Taken as (...) a whole, the book will contribute to the greater understanding of essential social responses to changes in ecosystems, including the generation, accumulation and transmission of ecological knowledge, structure and dynamics of institutions, and the cultural values underlying these responses. A set of new (or rediscovered) principles for sustainable ecosystem management is also presented. Linking Social and Ecological Systems will be of value to natural and social scientists interested in sustainability. (shrink)

In this introduction, the author argues that Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt can help us rediscover the foundations of politics and political thought. In the years since World War II, the prevailing paradigm of politics has largely centred on the redistribution of resources. Hobbes and Schmitt, by contrast, help us appreciate two other conceptions of politics. Firstly, these thinkers averred that it is the problem of order ? not redistribution ? which is the fundamental concern for any society. Secondly, (...) both were acutely aware of the role played by myth: that is, how shared ideas ? sometimes created for this very purpose ? serve to promote order, social cohesion, and law?abiding behaviour. The author also argues, finally, that normative theory and the social sciences in general have often neglected these two conceptions of politics. (shrink)

In Parkinson’s disease, the fronto-striatal network is involved in motor and cognitive symptoms. Working memory updating training engages this network in healthy populations, as observed by improved cognitive performance and increased striatal BOLD signal. This two-part study aimed to assess the feasibility of WM updating training in PD and measure change in cognition, movement and functional brain response in one individual with PD after WM updating training. A feasibility and single-subject study were performed in which patients with PD completed computerized (...) WM updating training. The outcome measures were the pre-post changes in criterion and transfer cognitive tests; cognitive complaints; psychological health; movement kinematics; and task-related BOLD signal. Participants in the feasibility study showed improvements on the criterion tests at post-test. FL displayed the largest improvements on the criterion tests and smaller improvements on transfer tests. Furthermore, FL reported improved cognitive performance in everyday life. A shorter onset latency and smoother upper-limb goal-directed movements were measured at post-test, as well as increased activation within the striatum and decreased activation throughout the fronto-parietal WM network. This two-part study demonstrated that WM updating training is feasible to complete for PD patients and that change occurred in FL at post-test in the domains of cognition, movement and functional brain response. (shrink)

Knee proprioception deficits and neuroplasticity have been indicated following injury to the anterior cruciate ligament. Evidence is, however, scarce regarding brain response to knee proprioception tasks and the impact of ACL injury. This study aimed to identify brain regions associated with the proprioceptive sense of joint position at the knee and whether the related brain response of individuals with ACL reconstruction differed from that of asymptomatic controls. Twenty-one persons with unilateral ACL reconstruction of either the right or left knee, as (...) well as 19 controls matched for sex, age, height, weight and current activity level, performed a knee joint position sense test during simultaneous functional magnetic resonance imaging. Integrated motion capture provided real-time knee kinematics to activate test instructions, as well as accurate knee angles for JPS outcomes. Recruited brain regions during knee angle reproduction included somatosensory cortices, prefrontal cortex and insula. Neither brain response nor JPS errors differed between groups, but across groups significant correlations revealed that greater errors were associated with greater ipsilateral response in the anterior cingulate, supramarginal gyrus and insula. This is the first study to capture brain response using fMRI in relation to quantifiable knee JPS. Activated brain regions have previously been associated with sensorimotor processes, body schema and interoception. Our innovative paradigm can help to guide future research investigating brain response to lower limb proprioception. (shrink)

Clausewitz is not as some misinterpretations suggest a philosopher of total war. An analysis of his hermeneutical key presented in the first chapter of the first book of 'On War' makes it clear that there is a crucial distinction between his pure abstract concept of war - the notion of absolute war - and his theory of real war, where the irrationality ofviolence and the force of the military will, are subjected to political rationality. According to Clausewitz politicians carry the (...) ultimate responsibility in determining the ends of war, and this can only be done after a thorough appraisal of national and international realities. One of the consequences of his position is that the military and political levels are not, as A. Rapoport suggests, interchangeable but in a subordinate position. Military leaders should always follow the logic of politics, politicians however should not neglect the grammar of war. Despite some texts that might suggest the contrary, Clausewitz held a clear option for a defensive policy. Value judgments are left to philosophers. (shrink)

_“Emotion as an element of contemporary Criticism in the intellectual Environment of the Weimar Republic – A contextual Reading of the Presentation of the Affective in Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt”_ This article examines a specific use of emotional concepts as well as a particular understanding of the affective in general in the work of Heidegger and Schmitt during the years 1919-1933. The general character of this idea of the affective is that it is developed as an element of (...) a critical engagement with discourses regarding institutional change. Thus, I will be reading the two thinkers in the light of institutional disputes present in the Weimar Republic. Heidegger is read in relation to the question of university reform, with which he was deeply involved in the 1920´s. Schmitt will be analyzed through the political situation of the newly established liberal democracy. In both cases, I will argue that a conception of the affective is developed that serves to attack a perceived relativism. This is seen in the fact that, for both thinkers, certain affective categories are linked to stable existential categories: being for Heidegger and the dichotomy between friend and foe for Schmitt. (shrink)

RésuméAristote n'a pas développé une théorie de la quantification du prédicat, mais une étude récente de Hasnawi a montré qu'Ibn Sīnā a consacré à celle-ci une étude rigoureuse. Assumant la structure aristotélicienne sujet-prédicat, Ibn Sīnā qualifie les propositions qui comportent un prédicat quantifié, de propositions déviantes. Une conséquence de cette approche avicennienne est que la seconde quantification est absorbée par le prédicat. La distinction claire ainsi opérée entre un sujet quantifié, qui pose le domaine de la quantification, et une partie (...) prédicative, qui construit une proposition sur ce domaine, correspond structurellement à la distinction, faite dans la théorie constructive des types, entre le type des ensembles et le type des propositions.Aristote n'a pas non plus combiné son analyse logique de la quantification avec sa théorie ontologique des relations ou de l’égalité. Ibn Sīnā, en revanche, a utilisé les syllogismes qui nécessitent une logique de l’égalité et il a examiné des cas où la quantification se combine, via l’égalité, avec des termes singuliers. En outre, ces réflexions sont essentielles pour sa théorie des nombres qui est fondée sur l'interaction entre l’un et le multiple. Lorsqu'on combine la théorie métaphysique de l’égalité telle qu'on la trouve chez Ibn Sīnā avec son travail sur la quantification du prédicat, il en résulte tout naturellement une logique de l’égalité. En effet, l'interaction entre la quantification du prédicat et l’égalité peut être appliquée aux exemples de syllogismes mentionnés par Ibn Sīnā dans lesquels ces notions interviennent. En utilisant les instruments formels fournis par la théorie constructive des types de Martin-Löf, cet article établit des liens entre la métaphysique d'Ibn Sīnā et son travail logique, liens qui ont été discutés en relation avec d'autres sujets par Thom et Street. Ibn Sīnā n'a pas développé une logique de l'identité, mais il a développé les moyens conceptuels de le faire. (shrink)

As in other European countries, in Denmark philosophy was an important factor in the cultural life of the nineteenth century. Kierkegaard lived and wrote in Copenhagen, where Hegelianism both flourished and met with serious criticism, and both of these elements can be found in his authorship. This chapter explores possible sources of inspiration for Kierkegaard's rejection of Danish Hegelianism and its follower, speculative theology, and discusses his influence on the fashionable Danish philosopher of the day, Rasmus Nielsen. By way of (...) conclusion, it is emphasized that Kierkegaard's understanding of Christianity and his struggle over it were decisive for a shift in Danish intellectual life around 1870. (shrink)

Carl-Johan Palmqvist recently examines a well-known form of non-doxastic religiosity called ultimism, which comes to us from J. L Schellenberg. He contends that traditional forms of religion are better candidates for non-doxastic religion for two reasons. First, their specificity makes them more likely to put one into contact with transcendental reality than ultimism. Second, religious experience can only be on traditional forms of religion, not on ultimism. I argue that Palmqvist’s rejection of ultimism is wrong. It’s false that (...) ultimism isn’t specific enough to put one into contact with transcendental reality. It’s also false that there aren’t religious experiences consistent with ultimism, but not with traditional forms of religion. There might be reasons for preferring traditional forms of religion to ultimism; however, Palmqvist fails to demonstrate that this is the case. (shrink)

Beneficence is a foundational ethical principle in medicine. To provide benefit to a patient is to promote and protect the patient’s wellbeing, to promote the patient’s interests. But there are different conceptions of wellbeing, emphasizing different values. These conceptions of wellbeing are contrary to one another and give rise to dissimilar ideas of what it means to benefit a patient. This makes the concept of beneficence ambiguous: is a benefit related to the patient’s goals and wishes, or is it a (...) matter of objective criteria that constitute wellbeing? This paper suggests a unified conception of wellbeing for use in medicine to determine what counts as a benefit. Two components of wellbeing are identified: (1) objective functioning/health and (2) the patient’s view of her own good. The paper explores how to apply, balance, and weigh these components in clinical situations to determine what counts as a benefit to a patient. (shrink)

The ecological crisis almost forces different disciplines to search together for a better world. We all share one earth: the closer we reach a certain point, the closer we come together. This places the paper amid the so-called science and religion dialogue in which theology increasingly cognises empirical research and scientific data. On the other hand, sciences are becoming increasingly aware of the need to transcend their evidential limitations to find a comprehensive paradigm. This paper will apply an exemplary methodology (...) by selecting the eco-theology of Jürgen Moltmann as a theologian who takes relevant results of scientific ecological research seriously. The Club of Rome, on the other hand, is an example of social (and natural) sciences urging to find a new inclusive paradigm for a world in peril. The juxtaposition of theology and science provides the need for a new value system emerging in social sciences. Randers makes clear that the culture of consumerism had to be replaced by cultural elements that provide substantial longer-term satisfaction and increase well-being. The latest report of the Club of Rome (2022) and Moltmann’s latest two titles on this topic (2019 and 2020) have been integrated into the argument and previous publications of the author. Contribution: This exemplary approach contributes to a scientifically grounded and biblically founded eco-theology. The two exponents of science and eco-theology provide the much-needed vocabulary for each other. The Earth Charter, one could add, provides a grammar for the engagement of eco-theology and environmental science. (shrink)

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (...) (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail. (shrink)

This paper presents a new modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences understood in the sense of "all other things being equal". This reading goes back to the seminal work of Von Wright in the early 1960's and has returned in computer science in the 1990' s and in more abstract "dependency logics" today. We show how it differs from ceteris paribus as "all other things being normal", which is used in contexts with preference defeaters. We provide a semantic analysis and (...) several completeness theorems. We show how our system links up with Von Wright's work, and how it applies to game-theoretic solution concepts, to agenda setting in investigation, and to preference change. We finally consider its relation with infinitary modal logics. (shrink)

A significant part of contemporary social ontology has been focused on understanding forms of collective intentionality. It is suggested in this paper that the contested nature of some institutional matters makes this kind of approach problematic, and instead an alternative approach is developed, one that is oriented towards a micro-level analysis of the institutional constraints that we face in everyday life and which can make sense of how there can be institutional facts that are deeply contested and yet still real. (...) The model is applied to two main examples, sexism and racism, and it is argued that on this approach it can make sense to understand both of them as institutions in our societies. (shrink)

There can be little doubt about the ethical imperative to ensure adequate vaccination uptake against certain infectious diseases. In the face of vaccine refusal, health authorities and providers instinctively appeal to coercive approaches or increased education as methods to ensure adequate vaccine uptake. Recently, some have argued that public fear around Ebola should be used as an opportunity for such approaches, should an Ebola vaccine become available. In this article, the author describes the difficulties associated with coercion and education when (...) addressing vaccine opposition. Both coercion and education can cause opposite effects than intended in certain circumstances. The correct area of focus is to address the breakdown in trust within clinical relationships. The author presents suggestions for an approach towards vaccine refusal that may be more promising. (shrink)

A number of general points behind the story of this paper may be worth setting out separately, now that we have come to the end.There is perhaps one obvious omission to be addressed right away. Although the word “information” has occurred throughout this paper, it must have struck the reader that we have had nothing to say on what information is. In this respect, our theories may be like those in physics: which do not explain what “energy” is (a notion (...) which seems quite similar to “information” in several ways), but only give some basic laws about its behaviour and transmission.The eventual recommendation made here has been to use a broad type-theoretic framework for studying various more classical and more dynamic notions of proposition in their interaction. This is not quite the viewpoint advocated by many current authors in the area, who argue for a whole-sale switch from a ‘static’ to a ‘dynamic’ perspective on propositions. This is not the place, however, to survey the conceptual arguments for and against such a more radical move.This still leaves many questions about possible reductions from one perspective to another. For instance, it would seem that classical systems ought to serve as a ‘limiting case’, which should still be valid after procedural details of some cognitive process have been forgotten. There are various ways of implementing the desired correspondence: e.g. by considering extreme cases with ⫅ equal to identity, or, in the pure relational algebra framework by considering only pairs (x, x). What we shall want then are reductions of dynamic logics, in those special cases, to classical logic. But perhaps also, more sophisticated views are possible. How do we take a piece of ‘dynamic’ prose, remove control instructions and the like, and obtain a piece of ‘classical’ text, suitable for inference ‘in the light of eternity’?There is also a more technical side to the matter of ‘reduction’. By now, Logic has reached such a state of ‘inter-translatability’ that almost all known variant logics can be embedded into each other, via suitable translations. In particular, once an adequate semantic has been given for a new system, this usually induces an embedding into standard logic: as we know, e.g., for the case of Modal Logic. Like-wise, all systems of dynamic interpretation or inference proposed so far admit of direct embedding into an ordinary ‘static’ predicate logic having explicit transition predicates (cf. van Benthem 1988b). Thus, our moral is this. The issue is not whether the new systems of information structure or processing are essentially beyond the expressive resources of traditional logical systems: for, they are not. The issue is rather which interesting phenomena and questions will be put into the right focus by them.The next broad issue concerns the specific use of the perspective proposed here, vis-à-vis concrete proposals for information-oriented or dynamic semantics. The general strategy advocated here is to locate some suitable base calculus and then consider which ‘extras’ are peculiar to the proposal. For instance, this is the spirit in which modal S4 would be a base logic of information models, and intuitionistic logicthe special theory devoting itself to upward persistent propositions. Or, with the examples in Section 4.1, the underlying base logic is our relational algebra, whereas, say, ordinary updates then impose special properties, such as ‘idempotence’: $$xRy \Rightarrow yRy$$ Does this kind of application presuppose the existence of one distinguished base logic, of which all others are extensions? This would be attractive-and some form of relational algebra or linear logic might be a reasonable candidate. Nevertheless, the enterprise does not rest on this outcome. What matters is an increased sensitivity to the ‘landscape’ of dynamic logics, just as with the ‘Categorial Hierarchy’ in Categorial Grammar (cf. van Benthem 1989a, 1991) where the family of logics with their interconnections seems more important than any specific patriarch.Finally, perhaps the most important issue in the new framework is the possibility of new kinds of questions arising precisely because of its differences from standard logic. Notably, given the option of regarding propositions as programs, it will be of interest to consider systematically which major questions about programming languages now make sense inside logic too.EXAMPLE. Correctness. When do we have $$\left[\kern-0.15em\left[ \pi \right]\kern-0.15em\right](\left[\kern-0.15em\left[ A \right]\kern-0.15em\right]) \subseteq \left[\kern-0.15em\left[ B \right]\kern-0.15em\right]$$ for (s, t) propositions A, B and a dynamic (s, (s, t)) proposition π?Program Synthesis. Which dynamic proposition will take us from an information state satisfying A to one satisfying B? (This question needs refinement, lest there be trivial answers.)Determinism. Which propositions as programs are deterministic, in the sense of defining single-valued functions from states to states?Querying. What does it mean to ask for information in the present setting? (Again, individual types referring to e will be crucial here.)This is not merely an agenda for wishful thinking. Within Logic, there are various ways of introducing such concerns into semantics, especially, using tools from Automata Theory. (See van Benthem 1989c for further discussion of such computational perspectives in ‘cognitive programming’.)At least if one believes that ‘dynamics’ is of the essence in cognition (rather than a mere interfacing problem between the halls of eternal truth and the noisy streets of reality), the true test for the present enterprise is the development of a significant new research program not merely copying the questions of old. (shrink)

Taking Löb's Axiom in modal provability logic as a running thread, we discuss some general methods for extending modal frame correspondences, mainly by adding fixed-point operators to modal languages as well as their correspondence languages. Our suggestions are backed up by some new results – while we also refer to relevant work by earlier authors. But our main aim is advertizing the perspective, showing how modal languages with fixed-point operators are a natural medium to work with.

While the best interest standard (BIS) enjoys wide endorsement as the ethical and decision-making standard in pediatrics, it has been criticized as vague and indeterminate. Alternate decision-making standards have been proposed to replace or augment the BIS, notably the harm principle (HP) and constrained parental autonomy (CPA) model. In this edition of The Journal of Clinical Ethics, Lainie Friedman Ross argues that CPA is a better standard than the BIS or the HP as both guide and limiter in pediatrics. In (...) response, I review the important work done by the BIS in pediatrics, and argue that neither the HP nor the CPA can take over these functions or replace the BIS. Among other things I argue: (1) The BIS provides more robust protections for the moral claims of children. (2) The CPA model and the HP do not resolve the indeterminacy and vagueness present in complex medical situations, and the BIS is better suited to deal with this vagueness and indeterminacy. (3) The BIS is a general principle of medical ethics with special application in pediatrics; it fits seamlessly into the system of medical ethics and fulfills many functions within pediatrics. The HP and the CPA model do not fit so readily within medical ethics, and are not equipped to take over the functions of the BIS. (shrink)

In considering patriarchy as potentially institutional and as a characteristic also of contemporary Western societies, a fundamental issue concerns how to make sense of largely informal institutions to begin with. Traditional accounts of institutions have often focused on formalized ones. It is argued here, however, that the principal idea behind one commonly accepted conception of institutions can be developed in a way that better facilitates an explication of informal institutions. When applied to the phenomenon of patriarchy, such an approach can (...) then also allow us to ontologically make sense of gray areas and hierarchies of authority, as well as the intersectionality of social positions. (shrink)

Defensive medicine has become pervasive. Defensive medicine is often thought of as a systems issue, the inevitable result of an adversarial malpractice environment, with consequent focus on system-responses and tort reform. But defensive medicine also has ethical and professionalism implications that should be considered beyond the need for tort reform. This article examines defensive medicine from an ethics and professionalism perspective, showing how defensive medicine is deeply problematic. First, a definition of defensive medicine is offered that describes the essence of (...) defensive practice: clinical actions with the goal of protecting the clinician against litigation or some adverse outcome. Ethical arguments against defensive medicine are considered: defensive medicine is deceptive and undermines patient autonomy; defensive medicine subjugates patient interests to physician interests and violate fiduciary obligations; defensive medicine exposes patients to harm without benefit; defensive medicine undermines trust in the profession; and defensive medicine violates obligations of justice. Possible arguments in favor of defensive medicine are considered and refuted. Defensive practice is therefore unethical and unprofessional, and should be viewed as a challenge for medical ethics and professionalism. (shrink)